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GREEN PARADOX: OVERVIEW 2
“The countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol have pledged to limit global warm-
ing by reducing the demand for fossil fuels. But what about supply? If suppliers do not
react, demand reductions by a subset of countries are ineffective. They simply depress
the world price of carbon and induce the environmental sinners to consume what
the Kyoto countries have economized on. Even worse, if suppliers feel threatened by
a gradual greening of economic policies in the Kyoto countries that would damage
their future prices; they will extract their stocks more rapidly, thus accelerating global
warming.” Sinn (2008), p.360
1 Introduction
Climate change is a global environmental problem affecting current and future generations with
potentially dramatic consequences. Ideally, economists would like to tackle this problem by cor-
recting the underlying externality by introducing immediately a world-wide price on greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions.1 Unfortunately, immediate and world-wide action against GHG emissions
has proven impossible. In reality, climate policy is implemented in a rather ad hoc manner, via a
wide array of domestic carbon taxes, subsidies on clean energy and tradable carbon permit sys-
tems, changing over time, and differing from country to country, with many countries having no
or hardly any GHG emission reduction policy at all. The “far-from-first-best” nature of these poli-
cies have lead to worries about their actual effectiveness. As the opening sentences from Sinn’s
thought provoking article on imperfect climate policies (Sinn, 2008) nicely illustrate, emissions of
carbon dioxide from fossil fuels – the largest source of GHG emissions – may not go down at all in
response to demand reduction policies. Indeed, Sinn claims that it is possible that a Green Paradox
occurs: global emissions might increase in reaction to green policies.
Sinn’s article spawned a rapidly growing literature on the effect of imperfect carbon emission
abatement policies on global emissions. The aim of this paper is to review this literature and to
provide the reader with an insight into the underlying economic drivers. We identify four mech-
anisms that have the potential to generate a Green Paradox, and assess whether each mechanism
can be expected to lead to an increase in emissions in reality. While Sinn focus is on the response
of the owners of deposits of non-renewable resources, such as oil and coal, to climate policy, our
review also includes papers that discuss imperfect climate policy without this element.
1A large literature exists on the optimal paths of a carbon price and carbon emissions, see for example Ulph and Ulph
(1994), Farzin and Tahvonen (1996), Hoel and Kverndokk (1996), Tahvonen (1997), and Rickels and Lontzek (forthcom-
ing).
GREEN PARADOX: OVERVIEW 3
The first path leading to a Green Paradox is what Sinn defines as “gradual greening” in the con-
text of rising prices for carbon dioxide emissions. This theme has been widely studied since Peter
Sinclair’s classic article with the telling title “High does nothing and rising is worse: carbon taxes
should keep declining to cut harmful emissions” (Sinclair, 1992). We present a simple model of
non-renewable resources and discuss under which assumptions a carbon tax may induce an in-
crease in emissions. Following Gerlagh (2011) distinguish between a ‘strong’ Green Paradox, which
occurs when cumulative damages from climate change increase in response to climate policy, and
a ‘weak’ Green Paradox, which arises when climate policy increases current, immediate emissions.
Another mechanism that may generate a Green Paradox emerges when policy makers are not able
to impose emission reduction policies immediately and unexpectedly. In other words, environ-
mental policy suffers from long implementation lags. The Kyoto Protocol, for example, was agreed
upon in December 1998, came into force in February 2005, and its first commitment period started
in 2008. Alternatively, policy makers may find it politically expedient to allow firms and consumers
time to prepare, in order to reduce adjustment and compliance costs. We discuss the role of such
implementation lags in section 3.
The third mechanism operates through Sinn’s “demand reductions by a subset of countries”. Ever
since the topic of internationally coordinated GHG emission reduction policies appeared on pol-
icy makers’ agendas, economists have studied the possible effects of these policies in the context
of sub-global action. When a country or a group of countries reduces emissions, strong incentive
emerge for other countries to increase their emissions in response, a phenomenon known as in-
ternational carbon leakage. We discuss this literature in section 4, where we identify five channels
through which a unilateral emission reduction induces a change in emissions by other countries.
In the context of carbon leakage, a weak Green Paradox occurs when the emissions increase by
non-abating countries is larger than the emission reduction by abating countries, so that global
emissions increase in response to unilateral climate policy.
The fourth mechanism focuses on policies aimed at reducing demand for fossil fuels via subsidies
to alternative energy sources and via support for innovation. As (optimal) price paths for carbon
dioxide emissions are often not feasible, policy makers often use the politically more palatable in-
strument of subsidies for clean energy technologies. When resource owners realize that a cheap
alternative technology becomes available in the future, or that renewable energy gets subsidized,
they might accelerate extraction in order to exhaust their resource stocks before they become re-
dundant, leading to front loading of emissions and a (weak) Green Paradox.
Although we focus on the effects of climate policy on greenhouse gas emissions, it is obvious that
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the mechanisms we identify also apply to other environmental problems. As many of the papers
included in this review take a non-renewable resource as the starting point, the ‘climate’ policies
they study can be interpreted as any policy affecting resource use. Indeed, while the climate prob-
lem is one of a stock pollutant, many papers do not explicitly model pollution accumulation and
hence provide useful insights for other environmental policies (for example policies aimed at re-
ducing NOx and SO2 emissions) as well. In addition, although global warming necessitates global
policies, several of the policies reviewed may also be discussed or implemented at the local level.
In this sense, the relevance of the Green Paradox literature is broader, both in terms of pollutants
and scale, than usually recognized.
2 Carbon price paths
As noted in the introduction, most of the literature on the Green Paradox, including Sinn (2008),
assumes that carbon dioxide emissions stem from the use of a non-renewable resource. Although
a large literature exists on optimal carbon tax paths when emissions stem from the use of a non-
renewable resource (see e.g. Ulph and Ulph, 1994, Farzin and Tahvonen, 1996, Hoel and Kvern-
dokk, 1996, Tahvonen, 1997, Rickels and Lontzek, forthcoming) we are interested in the effects
of imperfect climate policy on emissions and resource extraction. To illustrate some of the basic
mechanisms behind the effects of suboptimal climate policy in the context of non-renewable re-
sources, we first sketch the basic ingredients for a simple model of resource extraction (see e.g.
Hoel, 2010b, Gerlagh, 2011).
Resource-owners are price takers and face an exogenous interest rate r . They maximize intertem-
poral profits by choosing an extraction path x(t ):
max
{x(t )}∞0
Π=
∞∫
0
(
p(t )−τ(t )− c (X (t )))x(t )e−r t dt (1.a)
s.t. X˙ (t )= x(t ), (1.b)
x(t )≥ 0∀t , (1.c)
X (t )≤ X¯ ∀t , (1.d)
X (0)= 0, (1.e)
where p(t )is the consumer price for the resource, τ(t ) is a carbon emissions tax (we set units such
that one unit of resource use generates one unit of emissions), and c (X (t )) are unit extraction
costs which are possibly a function of the amount of cumulative extraction X (t ), which over time
cannot be larger than the available resource stock X¯ . The market for the resource clears at each
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point in time as demand x(t )=D(p(t )) is satisfied by supply, and D(c(·))> 0 initially. In addition
to the non-renewable resource, a clean and perfectly substitutable alternative energy technology
(backstop technology) may be available at constant marginal cost b, so x(t ) = 0 for p(t ) ≥ b. We
denote the instant of the switch to the backstop energy source by tb , so p(tb)= b.
When does a carbon tax τ lead to unintended detrimental effects for the environment?2 When
does it lead to a Green Paradox? In terms of the model above, the degree of success of climate
policy can be measured along three dimensions. The first dimension is whether a policy decreases
initial extraction (and hence emissions). Greenhouse gas emissions accumulate in the atmosphere
and it is the stock or concentration level of GHGs in the atmosphere that determines the size of the
enhanced greenhouse effect and causes global warming when it gets too large. As part of the stock
of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is taken up each year by natural carbon sinks such as forests
and oceans, postponing emissions means giving the natural carbon cycle time to dissolve part of
the stock of GHGs in the atmosphere. Increasing current emissions, however, implies increasing
the stock of GHGs for a long time as natural uptake of the additional emissions is a slow process.
The second dimension considers the amount of cumulative extraction: does the policy induce
some resource owners to leave their deposits unused? Allen, Frame, Huntingford, Jones, Lowe,
Meinshausen, and Meinshausen (2009) propose to restrict global emissions in the 1750-2500 pe-
riod to 1 trillion tonnes carbon (1 TtC, 3.67 trillion tonnes CO2). The idea behind this proposal is
that policy targets based on limiting cumulative emissions of carbon dioxide are likely to be more
robust to scientific uncertainty than emission rate or concentration targets. The global intertem-
poral carbon budget they propose, implies that some of the stocks of fossil fuels, for example coal,
will have to remain unexploited. The authors find that total anthropogenic emissions of 1 TtC,
about half of which has already been emitted since industrialization began, results in a most likely
peak in carbon-dioxide-induced warming of 2◦C above pre-industrial temperatures.
The third dimension along which the success of climate policy can be measured is whether the net
present value of climate damages goes down or not. Following Gerlagh (2011) we say that a ‘strong’
Green Paradox occurs when the net present value of cumulative damages increases in response to
climate policy, whereas a ‘weak’ Green Paradox occurs when climate policy leads to front loading
of extraction (initial or early extraction increases).
2Whenever we write ‘tax’, the carbon price can alternatively be interpreted as the price of a tradable emission permit
on a competitive and optimally designed permit market.
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2.1 Constant carbon emission price paths3
In the simplest version of this model (henceforth called ‘Hotelling model’), we have c(·)= 0, τ(t )=
0 ∀t and no backstop, so the optimal extraction path gives
∞∫
0
x(t )dt = X¯ , (2)
that is, total extraction equals the available resource stock X¯ , and
p˙(t )= r p(t ). (3)
The latter equation is the well-known Hotelling rule (after Hotelling, 1931) which says that the
return to the producer (here equal to the consumer price) must grow at the rate of interest. This
equilibrium condition guarantees that the resource owner is indifferent between extraction at any
point in time. If there were some period of time [t1, t2] such that for any t ′ ∈ [t1, t2] she could earn
more than p(0)er t
′
, she would shift extraction towards this period of time. Alternatively, if during
this interval she would earn less than p(0)er t
′
, she would shift extraction out of this period of time.
In this Hotelling model, the entire resource stock X¯ will get extracted over time, so a carbon tax
will only affect the timing of extraction and emissions. However, as soon as extraction costs are
positive – which is obviously true in reality – a sufficiently ‘large’ carbon tax satisfying
∞∫
0
D (τ(t )+ c(·))dt < X¯ (4)
will push the scarcity rent to zero for resource deposits with the highest extraction costs and in-
duce their owners to leave some of these deposits unexploited (Hoel, 2010b). Hence, cumulative
extraction over the entire time horizon goes down. Whether this is good or bad for the climate,
depends on the exact time path of emissions and hence the time path of the carbon tax.
Following Hoel (2010b), assume that the carbon tax grows at a constant rate g . In addition, assume
(4) is not satisfied. Then (1.a) becomes
Π=
∞∫
0
((
p(t )− c(·)))x(t )e−r t −τ(0)e(g−r )t x(t ))dt . (5)
If the carbon tax grows at a rate r , the present value of the carbon tax is constant, so the carbon tax
is effectively a lump sum tax:
Π=
∞∫
0
(
p(t )− c(·))x(t )e−r t dt −τ(0)X¯ . (6)
3This subsection builds on parts from Hoel (2010b).
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As a consequence the path of extraction and emissions is not affected by climate policy: the carbon
tax is ineffective from an environmental perspective.
Next, consider the case of g > r , and assume that extraction costs c(·) are constant and equal to
c ≥ 0. Then initial discounted profits are higher than future discounted profits as τ(0)e(g−r )t grows
over time. Hence, resource owners will shift extraction from the future to the present in response to
the tax (the extraction path becomes steeper) and early emissions increase: a weak Green Paradox
occurs.
Finally, consider the case of g < r , for example a constant carbon tax (still assuming constant
extraction costs). Then initial discounted profits are lower than future discounted profits, the ex-
traction path becomes flatter and initial extraction decreases: emissions are postponed.
Thus far, we have assumed that either the entire resource stock gets extracted over time, or condi-
tion (4) is satisfied. Let’s now assume that even without a carbon tax, some of the resource deposits
remain unexploited. For this, we move away from the Hotelling model and introduce the backstop
technology, and assume that unit extraction costs c(·) are increasing in accumulated extraction
c(X (t )). We denote this model the ‘Heal model’, after Heal (1976). With this model the amount
of the resource that ultimately gets extracted X¯ is endogenous, even without climate policy: it is
determined by c(X¯ )= b. Deposits with extraction costs higher than b remain unexploited.
With a carbon tax, the equilibrium conditions for the optimal amount of cumulative extraction
over the entire time horizon, X ∗, become
c
(
X ∗
)= b−τ (tb) , (7)
tb∫
0
x(t )dt = X ∗, (8)
where tb is the time of the switch to the backstop.
From these equations it is clear that any carbon tax will induce some resource owners to leave
deposits unexploited. This is a stronger result than in the Hotelling model (where extraction costs
were zero) where a ‘sufficiently high’ carbon tax was required (see equation (4)).
In order to be able to discuss the effects of a constantly growing carbon tax, see how the simple
Hotelling rule (3) changes when we allow for a carbon tax and stock-dependent extraction costs:
p˙(t )= r (p(t )− c(X (t )))+ (τ˙(t )− rτ(t )) . (9)
Suppose the carbon tax is growing at rate r . Then the last term in this equation drops out and
the resource price path grows at the same rate as in the case without climate policy. However, the
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level of the price path must be higher and the level of extraction and consumption must be lower,
compared to the case of no carbon tax, since we have just concluded that with a Heal model, any
carbon tax will reduce cumulative extraction. Hence a carbon tax that grows at the rate r reduces
emissions at any point in time: again a stronger result than in the case of the Hotelling model.
This argument extends to the case where the carbon tax grows at a rate lower than r . In this case,
the net return to the resource owner in (9) increases over time, so it pays to postpone extraction.
Keeping initial extraction at the same level as in the case of no carbon tax then violates the result
that a carbon tax reduces total extraction, so a carbon tax that grows at a rate lower than r reduces
initial and total extraction and emissions.
It is then easy to see that when the carbon tax grows at a rate sufficiently higher than r , front
loading of extraction will arise. That is, early emissions rise (a weak Green Paradox occurs), but
still total cumulative extraction will be lower compared to the case of no carbon tax. Whether
a strong Green Paradox occurs then depends on the discount rate and the shape of the climate
damage function.
Hoel (2010b) then introduces a two-period version of the Heal model. He assumes that extraction
costs in the first period are zero whereas unit extraction costs are nondecreasing in cumulative ex-
traction in the second period: c ′(X )≥ 0.4 Including a discount factor for the second period, Hoel
is then able to study the effects of changes in (expectations about) the second period carbon tax
using a simple model in which a discrete time version of the simple Hotelling rule (3) holds. Given
some carbon tax levels for the two periods, an increase in the expected second-period tax unam-
biguously increases extraction and hence emissions in the first period: a weak Green Paradox. As
energy becomes more expensive in the second period, resource owners increase their supply in
the first period, inducing a lower scarcity rent and higher supply in period 1. As the time interval
during which fossil fuels are extracted is fixed (and hence no backstop technology is needed), this
result is stronger than in the continuous time version of the Heal model discussed above, where
only tax growth rates sufficiently higher than the rate of interest induced a weak Green Paradox.
Hoel (2010a) extends this 2-period model with a backstop technology, but contrary to the Heal-
with-backstop model discussed above, this energy source requires investment in period one, of
which a fraction a of the returns are obtained in period 1 and the remainder in period 2. Unit in-
vestment costs (in units of the final energy good) for the alternative energy source are increasing
in the level of investment and investment is always positive. The author then studies the effects of
4Note that c ′(X ) > is needed to have an intertemporal problem; otherwise the resource is available at constant
marginal cost and in infinite supply.
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an increase in the second period carbon tax and finds that the results depend on marginal extrac-
tion costs and the share of the returns to investment in the clean energy source that are obtained
in the first period. For sufficiently low (second-period) marginal extraction costs, an increase in
the second-period tax induces a decrease in first-period extraction and an increase in investment
in the alternative energy source. When marginal extraction costs are not too low and the share of
the returns to the alternative energy source that are obtained in the first period is not too high,
a weak Green Paradox occurs as first-period extraction increases, even though investment in al-
ternative energy increases in response to the tax increase. When both marginal extraction costs
and a are large, a weak Green Paradox occurs and investment in alternative energy decreases. The
last two results are in line with the Heal model without endogenous investment, but the first re-
sult (no Green Paradox despite a rise in the future carbon tax) is different. In Hoel (2010a), due to
low marginal extraction cost, first-period extraction is hardly affected by the higher tax. However,
investments in alternative energy become more profitable due to the tax increase, which reduces
the demand for fossil energy in the first period.
In sum: in the more realistic Heal model, a weak Green Paradox is less likely to occur than in
the Hotelling model. Not only will any carbon tax induce some of the resources to remain unex-
ploited in the former model, even a carbon tax growing at a rate slightly higher than the interest
rate need not induce an increase in initial extraction. Endogenous investment in the alternative
energy source may prevent a Green Paradox when marginal extraction costs are sufficiently low.
2.2 The problem of commitment and the role of expectations
In the previous subsection we assumed that the future price path for CO2 emissions was known
at each point in time. This assumes that the government is credible when announcing the price
path at t = 0, and (hence) is able to commit to this path. Although this is a common assumption
in the environmental economics literature, this clearly need not be true in reality. For example, if
the current government gives a different weight to climate damages than future governments, or
if firms make irreversible investments in clean technologies after the initial announcement, the
future carbon tax set by the then government need not be the same as the one announced at t = 0.
Hoel (2010b) uses the two-period version of the Heal model without a backstop, outlined above,
to study this problem. In this model, the second period is the ‘distant future’ for which it may
not be possible to commit to a carbon price path in advance (the author suggests 10 to 15 years).
He assumes full commitment is not possible and the expected second-period tax depends on the
level of the first-period tax. Then, if total stock is exogenous (c ′ → ∞, so we have a Hotelling
GREEN PARADOX: OVERVIEW 10
model), an increase in the first-period tax will induce an increase in first-period extraction, and
hence a weak Green Paradox, if the discount factor times the marginal increase in the expected
second-period carbon tax due to an increase in the current (first-period) carbon tax is larger than
one. This result is no surprise and corresponds to the Hotelling model discussed in the previous
subsection with a tax rate growing at a rate higher than the rate of interest. With an endogenous
stock (Heal model), this product should be ‘sufficiently large’, corresponding to the Heal case with
full commitment discussed above. Hoel (2010b, p.22) concludes that “[f]or reasonable modeling
of these expectations, a higher current carbon tax will reduce near-term emissions.”
2.3 Carbon price paths and the Green Paradox: conclusions
As summarized above, a weak Green Paradox is less likely to occur in the more realistic Heal model
than in the Hotelling model as any carbon tax will induce some of the resources to remain unex-
ploited in the Heal model, and even a carbon tax growing at a rate slightly higher than the interest
rate need not induce an increase in initial extraction, both contrary to the Hotelling model.
Clearly the effects of a carbon price path depend on how resource owners think it will affect the
net present value of their profits. Hence incentive compatible policies and perfect foresight play an
important role, and are a possible line for further research. In addition, it is clear that modeling al-
ternative energy sources as a perfectly substitutable alternative is too simple, as non-renewable re-
sources and clean alternatives need not serve the same markets. Indeed, different non-renewables
need not serve the same markets: coal is near-exclusively used in electricity generation; most oil
is used in transportation (although some countries have a significant share of electricity from oil);
most gas is used in electricity generation, but some of it is used in space heating and transport as
well.
3 Announcing climate policy in advance
Above we have assumed that the carbon tax is immediately and unexpectedly introduced, and
that there is only one resource in the economy. In reality, most environmental policies (or even
government policies in general) do not come as a surprise. Coming to an agreement (within a
government, or between different governments in case of an international agreement such as the
Kyoto Protocol), administrative procedures and the idea that announcing policy before actually
implementing it gives agents time to adjust, and hence reduce the costs of compliance, all make for
a time lag between the instant at which agents first learn or expect that a policy will be introduced
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and the instant of actual implementation. During this ‘interim phase’, agents are not bound by the
policy. In the case of a carbon tax or emissions cap, agents are still free to emit and to emit for free,
although they know that from a known point in time onward a policy will be imposed. Indeed, the
knowledge or expectation that a future policy will be introduced (‘announcement’ for short) may
itself induce agents to change their behavior.
3.1 Announcement effects with non-renewable resources
Di Maria, Smulders, and Van der Werf (2008) use a model related to the Hotelling model outlined
above (with demand stemming from a general, strictly concave utility function) and assume that a
cap on the flow of emissions is announced at t = 0 and implemented from an exogenous date T > 0
onward. In its simplest form, this is a special case of the rising carbon tax, with g > r discussed
in section 2.1: during the interim phase the price for carbon dioxide emissions is zero, then it
jumps up at t = T to make sure the emission cap is not violated, and then it declines until at some
point in time the resource stock has become sufficiently small, so that without climate policy,
extraction and hence emissions are so low that the cap is no longer binding. Di Maria, Smulders,
and Van der Werf (2008) generalize the model for the case of any number of resources, that possibly
differ in their emissions intensity (for example, coal, oil and natural gas). They then show that
the announcement of the cap induces an increase in the level of energy use and hence resource
extraction during the interim phase.5 As the resources become abundant during the period in
which the ceiling is binding since less can be extracted than what agents prefer, and as resource
owners want to exhaust their resource stocks, the resource price (scarcity rent) during the interim
phase is lower than in the case where government intervention would never take place (‘laissez
faire’), inducing higher demand and extraction rates. Assuming that emissions per unit of energy
do not change, or fall proportionally less than the increase in the level of energy use, emissions in
the interim phase are higher than in the case no policy would have been announced, so a weak
Green Paradox occurs.
A similar result is found in Eichner and Pethig (2010) for the case of one resource but multiple
countries. They use a 3-region, 2-period Hotelling-type model where one region exports a non-
renewable resource and imports a final good while the other regions (one of which is subject to
an existing emissions cap in either one or both periods) import the resource to produce the final
5Interestingly, Di Maria, Smulders, and Van der Werf (2008) also show that utility – which solely comes from resource
use – and resource use jump down at the instant of implementation, despite the fact that forward-looking agents know
at t = 0 that a constraint will be imposed at a known future date.
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good. This final good is produced from the resource (which emits CO2 when used in final good
production) and a fixed factor. As in the Hotelling model introduced above, the entire resource
stock will get exhausted over time. Apart from climate policy the resource-importing regions are
symmetric. All agents are price takers and the final good and resource markets clear at each point
in time. Among other things, the authors are interested in the effect of a change in the emissions
cap of the abating region on carbon leakage, which they define as an increase in emissions by
the non-abating region in the first period. A (weak) Green Paradox occurs when global emissions
increase in the first period. Eichner and Pethig show that when the abating region faces a cap
in period 2 and announces at t = 0 that the second-period cap is tightened, a weak Green Para-
dox may occur, depending on parameter values. A high intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
consumption, or a high (absolute value of) the period-2 demand elasticity for fossil fuels in the
non-abating country, or a tight constraint, or low first-period emissions of the non-abating coun-
try, all ceteris paribus, may induce an increase in global emissions in the first period in response
to the announced tightening of the second-period cap by the abating region. The intuition behind
this condition is as follows. The higher the substitution elasticity, the larger is the consumption re-
sponse to the change in the second-period price of the final good, and the more production (and
hence fossil fuel consumption and emissions) are shifted to the first period. As a consequence, the
period-1 emissions increase by the non-abating region must be larger. However, the authors also
show that an emission reduction by the non-abating region in response to a tightening of the sec-
ond period cap by the abating region may occur when the intertemporal elasticity is sufficiently
small and the period-2 cap is not too tight.
The results found by Di Maria, Smulders, and Van der Werf (2008) do not depend on parameter
values, since they study the case of a closed economy, and besides the resources, no other goods
are produced in the economy. However, they find that while initial resource extraction will increase
due to the announcement, the effect on emissions will depend on relative extraction of high- and
low-carbon fossil fuels (e.g. coal and gas). To study the effect on relative extraction, and hence
emissions intensity of energy use, Di Maria, Smulders, and Van der Werf (2008) assume that two
perfectly substitutable resources that differ in their carbon content exist. In the period during
which the cap is binding, a positive emissions price (e.g. a permit price, or a carbon tax) exists,
which makes high-carbon inputs relatively less attractive than low-carbon inputs. Indeed, since –
given the cap – the highest level of energy use can be obtained by using only the low-carbon input,
as this gives more energy per unit of emissions, this input becomes relatively scarce if the stock of
this resource is too small to use this fuel exclusively during the period in which the emissions cap
is binding. If this is the case, the relative price (scarcity rent) of the cleaner fuel will be higher as
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compared to the case of laissez faire. The authors show that (expected) emissions intensity will not
decrease due to the announcement, and that it will go up when the initial stock of the low-carbon
input (e.g. natural gas) is too small to warrant exclusive use during the constrained period, and
the initial stock of the high-carbon input (e.g. coal) is large. In this case, it is optimal to preserve
the low-carbon input for use during the constrained phase, and (expected) use of the high-carbon
input increases during the interim phase, as compared to laissez faire. In sum: Di Maria, Smulders,
and Van der Werf (2008) show that announcement of climate policy, in the context of a Hotelling-
type model, induces a weak Green Paradox both because the level of energy use increases in the
interim phase, and because the order of resource extraction may change in favor of the dirty input.
3.2 Announcement effectswithout non-renewable resources
Smulders, Tsur, and Zemel (2010) approach the same problem – announcement of a carbon price
– from a different perspective. Like Di Maria, Smulders, and Van der Werf (2008) they use a closed-
economy continuous time model, but they abstract from non-renewable resources and instead
assume that fossil energy is never scarce, and available at constant marginal costs. A second, per-
fectly substitutable energy source comes from a specific capital stock at zero marginal cost (and
can be thought of as solar energy). Output comes from a constant returns to scale production func-
tion with a capital stock, inelastically supplied labour, and energy. Consumers have the standard
strictly concave instantaneous utility function and can choose between investment in the general
capital stock or the capital stock for solar energy. Without (announcement of) climate policy, and
assuming fossil energy is not ‘too cheap’, there will ultimately be a transition from fossil to solar
energy as investment in the initially more productive general capital stock drives down the rate of
return in investment in this stock, which makes investment in solar energy more attractive over
time. The authors assume that announcement at t = 0 that a carbon price will be introduced at
time T > 0 does not make solar energy competitive during the interim phase. However, it may
become competitive from the instant of implementation of the carbon tax onward.
The positive carbon price from t = T onward implies lower fossil energy use and lower produc-
tivity of the general capital stock, relative to laissez faire, as well as lower consumption, from this
instant onward. Agents may mitigate this shock through increased investment in the stock of gen-
eral capital during the interim phase. This involves a trade-off between lower utility during the
interim phase due to increased savings, and higher productivity of labour and energy once the
tax is introduced, due to a larger capital stock. Smulders, Tsur, and Zemel (2010) show that if the
product of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (which is typically smaller than one) and
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the capital elasticity of GDP is smaller than one, the willingness to prevent the shock is so strong
that consumers increase savings during the interim phase in order to invest in capital. As the in-
creased savings lead to a higher capital stock during the interim phase as compared to laissez faire,
and since capital and energy are complements, emissions during the interim phase increase due
to announcement of the carbon tax. This weak Green Paradox occurs whether or not solar en-
ergy becomes competitive from the instant of policy implementation onward. The authors also
show that this result also holds when the government is not able to fully commit to the announced
policy, and consumers and firms take the instant of implementation to be uncertain.
3.3 Announcement of climate policy and the Green Paradox: conclusions
In practice, most (environmental) policies do not come as a surprise to consumers and firms. Po-
litical or legal constraints, or the desire to give agents time to prepare to the policy in order to
reduce adjustment and implementation costs, all make that agents are informed about a policy
before its actual implementation. When agents know that at some future date emissions of car-
bon dioxide will be subject to a tax or cap, they may be induced to increase their emissions in
the interim phase between announcement and implementation, such that a weak Green Paradox
occurs.
For this announcement effect to occur it is not necessary that emissions stem from a non-renew-
able resource. Consumption smoothing can induce consumers to save more during the interim
phase, to build up the stock of capital, and mitigate the negative effect on production from re-
duced energy use once the policy is implemented. When emissions do stem from non-renewable
resources, a weak Green Paradox may also occur in case of emission reduction policies by a group
of countries. Furthermore, the announcement may induce owners of high-carbon resources to in-
crease extraction during the interim phase, as their resource becomes less valuable once the policy
is in place. This increases the carbon content of energy use and enhances the effect on emissions
from the increase in energy use itself. Whether a strong Green Paradox occurs, depends on the
time path of the social cost of carbon, which is not modeled in any of the papers discussed in this
section.
Although only few papers have studied the effects of policy announcement on emissions, the re-
sult that a weak Green Paradox may occur seems robust as the fundamentals underlying those
papers differ significantly. Of course, more research in this area is warranted, preferably using
models based on real-world data.
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4 Unilateral carbon pricing and international carbon leakage
The previous section has shown that a weak Green Paradox may occur when carbon abatement
policies fail to cover the entire time horizon. In this section we focus on the case where policies fail
to cover all countries – a problem that was already touched upon above when discussing Eichner
and Pethig (2010) in the context of announced policy.
Although climate change is a global problem, international negotiations have failed to deliver a
global approach to emission reductions. Underlying this problem is the classic market failure of
emission reductions being a global public good: when some country decides to introduce emis-
sion reduction policies to correct the externality stemming from GHG emissions, all other coun-
tries benefit from slower global warming, and they cannot be excluded from doing so. This obser-
vation has led to the concern that unilateral emission reductions will simply lead to an increase in
emissions by other countries, a phenomenon known as ‘carbon leakage’, which has been a much-
addressed topic both in politics and in research for some two decades.6 Indeed, it has been an
important argument in the decision of the United States not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. For ex-
ample, U.S. senator Chuck Hagel – co-sponsor of the 1997 Byrd-Hagel Resolution, which states
that the U.S. Senate will not be a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol – argued that “[t]he main effect
of the assumed policy [i.e. the Kyoto Protocol] would be to redistribute output, employment, and
emissions from participating to non-participating countries”.7 In this context, a Green Paradox is
said to occur when global emissions increase in response to a unilateral emission reduction.
4.1 Five channels of carbon leakage
We identify five different channels through which emission reductions by a group of countries
affect emissions by non-abating countries. First we discuss the mechanisms behind each channel
and whether the respective channel is likely to increase or decrease carbon leakage. We then move
to the quantitative results from the applied general equilibrium (AGE) modeling literature. This
literature uses numerical multi-sector multi-country models to simulate the effects of emission
reduction policies on several variables, including carbon leakage. We conclude this section with a
brief discussion on whether carbon leakage is likely to lead to a Green Paradox, i.e. a global increase
in emissions in response to unilateral emission reductions.
Before we present the five channels of carbon leakage, we briefly discuss some of the main ele-
6‘Unilateral’ here means any subset of countries that fails to cover all countries.
7Remarks by Senator Hagel at ‘Countdown to Kyoto - International Conference on The Consequences of Mandatory
Global CO2 Emission Reductions’, August 21, 1997, Canberra, Australia.
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ments of AGE models, as these models have been widely used to assess carbon leakage issues. The
AGE models discussed in this section do not include non-renewable resources and, to the extent
that they are dynamic, they are not forward-looking. This is a major deviation from the mod-
els discussed in the previous sections. Generally, multi-region AGE models use a representative
firm with a constant returns to scale technology for each sector in each region. Consumers and
firms buy goods from each sector from different regions, as usually the output produced by sec-
tor X in country A is an imperfect substitute to the output produced by the same sector in region
B. This is usually modeled through constant elasticity of substitution preference functions with
finite elasticities. This so-called ‘Armington assumption’ (named after Armington, 1969) allows
for intra-industry trade and prevents extreme specialization effects. Hence, with the Armington
assumption, international prices do not equalize.
4.1.1 Themarginal damages channel
The first channel through which a unilateral emission reduction induces a change in emissions by
other countries is the marginal damages channel and is based on the public good aspect of uni-
lateral emission reductions. Emissions of GHGs stem to a large extent from the use of particular
products (in the context of CO2 mostly fossil fuels) by firms and consumers. National authorities
can (partially) correct for this externality by imposing policies (e.g. a carbon price) aimed at emis-
sion reductions. However, emission reductions are a public good: as damages stem from the stock
of GHGs in the atmosphere, and hence depend on emissions from all countries, a unilateral emis-
sion reduction brings costs to an abating country, while the benefits are enjoyed by all countries.
As a consequence, all countries have an incentive to free ride on other countries’ policies.
In Hoel (1991), environmental damage cost functions are convex in the sum of emission reduc-
tions from the two countries, while abatement costs are increasing and convex in each region’s
own level of abatement. For given emissions from the other country, it is individually rational
for each country to equate its marginal abatement costs with its marginal environmental cost.
If emissions are reduced in a particular country, marginal environmental costs will go down in all
other countries. Each country will therefore adjust its emissions upwards (carbon leakage), so that
marginal abatement costs again are equal to their marginal environmental damage costs. When
countries behave non-cooperatively, global emissions will still go down.8 This basic result has
8Based on these notions, a large literature on coalition formation for emission reduction policies has developed.
However, as we focus on carbon leakage rather than the possibility of forming and the stability of coalitions, we disre-
gard this literature.
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been confirmed by many authors, see e.g. Barrett (1994). Hoel (1991) also shows that when allow-
ing for side payments, a Green Paradox may occur, depending on the marginal cost functions for
emission reductions. If in a two-country world a country unilaterally reduces emissions beyond
the point where marginal benefits equal marginal cost, its payoff will decrease while the payoff of
the other country will increase. It then depends on the concavity of the abatement cost functions
of the two regions whether total emissions will increase or decrease; when marginal abatement
costs for the first region are steeply increasing relative to those of the second region, a Green Para-
dox is more likely to occur.
4.1.2 The energymarket channel
The energy market channel is based on the supply and demand responses to changes in energy
prices, notably the prices of coal and oil (see e.g. Bohm, 1993). If unilateral emission reduction
policies induce a drop in the global demand for (especially carbon-intensive) energy sources, the
world price for these goods will fall. As a consequence, the demand for these energy sources will
increase in non-abating countries. The size of the response will depend, among other things, on
supply and demand elasticities. If fossil fuels are inelastically supplied, the rate of carbon leakage
(the share of emission reductions by abating countries that is offset by emission increases by non-
abating countries) will be 100%, since prices will adjust such that the demand reduction by abating
countries will be exactly offset by a demand increase in other countries. Demand responses de-
pend, among other things, on the degree of market integration of each fossil fuel. Oil is a relatively
homogeneous good, so the demand by one region can easily be substituted by demand from an-
other region. Coal, however, differs strongly in type and quality over regions, and has higher trans-
port costs per unit of energy. A fall in the price of a particular type of coal in a particular region
will then not induce large substitution effects towards this type of coal in other regions. In AGE
models, this effect is reflected by relatively low Armington elasticities for coal, compared to oil. In
addition, the response to lower prices depends on the degree of intra-fuel substitutability as well
as the degree of substitutability between energy and other inputs, such as labor and capital.
Burniaux and Oliveira Martins (forthcoming) discuss the sensitivity of leakage results for changes
in the values of particular parameters in a simplified static AGE model. They use a 2-region (An-
nex I and the rest of the world) model with five inputs (a labour-fixed-factor composite, capital,
oil, coal, low-carbon energy) and a non-energy final good. In their central case, oil is treated as a
globally homogenous good, whereas the final good and coal are differentiated by region (i.e. non-
homogenous; Armington assumption); the other inputs are non-tradable. The authors simulate
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the implementation of a carbon abatement target in Annex I equivalent to that of the first com-
mitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Their central case has a leakage rate of 4%, that is, 4% of
emission reductions by Annex I is offset by an emissions increase by non-Annex I countries.
Their sensitivity analysis shows that their leakage result is insensitive to changes in the supply
elasticity of oil, but rather sensitive to changes in the supply elasticity of coal, for low values of this
elasticity. This reflects the fact that a zero supply elasticity leads to a leakage rate of 100%. For coal
supply elasticities above 2 the leakage rate is below 20%. Unfortunately there is very little empir-
ical evidence on coal supply elasticities, and values used in the AGE literature differ strongly. For
example, Burniaux and Oliveira Martins (forthcoming) choose an elasticity of 20 in their central
case, whereas Paltsev (2001) has a unit supply elasticity and Babiker (2005) has a value of 0.5. Palt-
sev (2001) also presents the results of sensitivity analyses regarding fossil fuel supply elasticities
and finds a leakage rate of 4.7% when all supply elasticities are equal to 20, and a rate of 14.7%
when all fossil energy supply elasticities are equal to 0.5.
Only few papers have studied international carbon leakage through the energy market channel
using a model with non-renewable resources. Hoel (2011) uses a 2-country, continuous time, par-
tial equilibrium model. The global resource market is based on the Hotelling model introduced in
section 2: the resource is in fixed supply and extraction costs are zero, so the resource price grows
at the interest rate. A perfectly substitutable clean backstop resource exists, supplied an constant
marginal costs b. The two countries have the same domestic demand function for energy. Each
country has an exogenous and constant carbon tax. The author abstracts from trade and income
effects: the resource is the only good and changes in the value of the resource does not affect the
purchasing power of consumers. If both countries then have the same constant tax rate, an in-
crease in this rate in both countries has the same effects as the introduction of a constant tax in
the Hotelling model, as discussed in section 2.1: the instant of the switch to the backstop is post-
poned, the extraction path becomes flatter, and initial extraction declines, so no Green Paradox
occurs.
If the two countries differ in their initial carbon tax, things become more complicated. If one
country increases its (constant) carbon tax, emissions unambiguously increase at each point in
time in the other country due to a lower resource price (scarcity rent). In addition, this country
will extend its period of resource use and switch to the backstop at a later date. The country with
the tax increase faces the same effect, but in addition the tax increase will make its consumer price
path flatter, shifting consumption from the present to the future. The net effect on the instant of
the switch to the backstop depends on the demand elasticities in the two countries. If they are
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such that this instant is postponed in the country with the tax increase, the global effect will be
the same as with identical tax rates, and initial global emissions decrease. If demand elasticities
are such that the tax increase induces the country with the tax increase to make to switch to the
backstop at an earlier date, then still initial global emissions decrease if it is the country with the
higher tax that increases its tax rate. If, however, the country with the lower tax rate increases
its emissions price and in response makes the switch to the backstop at an earlier date, the total
extraction period is shortened and with sufficiently low price elasticities, a weak Green Paradox
occurs. Indeed, assuming that the social costs of carbon do not increase at a rate higher than the
discount rate (i.e. the present value of the social cost of carbon declines over time), Hoel (2011)
finds that the increase in early emissions due to the unilateral tax increase leads to a strong Green
Paradox: the net present value of damages increases.9
While Hoel (2011) uses a partial equilibrium model, abstracting from trade, Eichner and Pethig
(2010) use a small general equilibrium model with a non-renewable to study the energy-market
channel of carbon leakage. As noted in the previous section, they use an analytical 3-region, 2-
period Hotelling-type model in which one region exports a non-renewable resource and imports
a final good while the other regions (one of which is subject to an existing emissions cap in either
one or both periods) import the resource to produce the final good. This final good is produced
from the resource (which emits CO2 when used in final good production) and a fixed factor. The
resource stock is given and extraction costs are zero, so over time, the entire resource stock will get
exhausted (over time fuel supply is perfectly inelastic, which favors carbon leakage). Apart from
climate policy the resource-importing regions are symmetric. All agents are price takers and the
final good and resource markets clear at each point in time. The authors are interested in the effect
of a change in the emissions cap of the abating region on carbon leakage, which they define as an
increase in emissions by the non-abating region in the first period. A weak Green Paradox occurs
when this emissions increase is such that global emissions increase in the first period.
9Hoel (2011) and, as we will see later, Gerlagh (2011) assume that the social cost of carbon, or the net present value
of marginal damages, does not grow at a rate higher than the discount or interest rate. In case of a ceiling on the stock
of GHG in the atmosphere (e.g. through a stabilization target) and taking into account the uptake by natural carbon
sinks, the growth rate of the social cost of carbon is higher than the (utility) discount rate as long as the ceiling has not
been reached (see e.g. Chakravorty, Moreaux, and Tidball, 2008). In models of optimal carbon pricing such as Hoel
and Kverndokk (1996) and Tahvonen (1997), the growth rate of the social cost of carbon depends on the rate of natural
uptake and the level of marginal damages: the growth rate is smaller than the discount rate if the latter are higher than
the rate of natural uptake. Hoel and Kverndokk (1996) show that the social cost of carbon starts to decline before the
stock of accumulated greenhouse gases. If one argues that the stock of GHGs should soon be stabilized, a growth rate
of the social cost of carbon below the discount rate may not be far off the mark.
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When the abating region tightens an existing first-period cap (but its second-period emissions are
free), the world price for fuels falls (in both periods, due to the Hotelling price path), and first-
period consumption becomes more expensive relative to second period consumption. Hence for
the non-abating region the price of the input goes down while the relative price of its output goes
up. The global change in first-period emissions consists of three parts: a direct effect from the
tighter cap in the abating region, an indirect effect from the fall in the price for fossil fuel, and
an indirect effect through the change in the relative price of the final good. The second effect is
smaller the more price elastic aggregate fuel demand is in period 2, and the more price elastic
the fuel demand of the non-abating region is in period 1. The third effect is larger the more price
elastic is the aggregate fuel demand in period 2; the more price elastic is the fuel demand of the
non-abating region in period 1, and the greater is the decline in the second-period price of the
consumption good (which depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consump-
tion). Combined, these effects lead to an increase in output and emissions in the non-abating
region in the first period, so carbon leakage is positive.
Next, Eichner and Pethig (2010) show the conditions under which a Green Paradox may occur.
A low intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption, or a high (absolute value of) the
demand elasticity for fossil fuels in the non-abating country, or a tight constraint, or high first-
period emissions of the non-abating country – all ceteris paribus – all may induce a Green Paradox.
The intuition behind this condition is as follows. The lower the substitution elasticity, the smaller is
the consumption response to the change in the second-period price of the final good, and the less
production (and hence fossil fuel consumption and emissions) are shifted to the second period.
As a consequence, period-1 leakage must be larger. This effect is enhanced, the higher is the first-
period price elasticity in the non-abating region. Eichner and Pethig (2010) show that the results
are qualitatively unchanged when the abating region has a cap in both periods, and the second-
period cap is unchanged.10
If the abating region faces a cap in period 2 and announces at t = 0 that the second-period cap
is tightened, then the conditions for a Green Paradox are reversed as compared to a tightening of
the period 1 cap, and in addition a lower period-2 final good price reduces likelihood of a Green
Paradox. However, the authors also show that negative leakage – an emission reduction by the
non-abating region in response to a tightening of the second period cap by the abating region –
may occur when the intertemporal elasticity is sufficiently small.
10Interestingly, Eichner and Pethig find that extending the abating region at the expense of the non-abating region
– increasing the cap proportionally so that the cap is as stringent as before enlargement – reduces total first-period
emissions and hence the likelihood of a green paradox.
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Using an analytical, static, multi-region model, Harstad (2010) shows that carbon leakage through
the energy market channel can be prevented through trade in resource deposits. In his model, a
coalition of countries has damages from emissions included in the utility function, whereas sev-
eral other countries don’t. A carbon resource is the only good in the economy, and firms in all
regions take prices as given. However, trade in a deposit affects the world fuel price, as these
are non-marginal changes in the amount of fuel available. Extraction costs are increasing in the
level of extraction and deposits differ in their extraction costs. Hence, the marginal deposit has
extraction costs that are close to the world fuel price (so its scarcity rent is close to zero). Then
its owner is almost indifferent about exploiting, and supply is locally inelastic, while the coalition
has a higher valuation for not exploiting due to environmental damages. If the coalition buys and
does not exploit the resource, the coalition does not need to fear supply-side leakage, it does not
need to regulate demand, there is no consumption leakage, and the marginal benefits of fossil fuel
are equalized across countries. When allowing for a two-period Heal-type model (total extraction
costs are given; allocation over time matters), leakage is still zero when the coalition buys deposits
at t = 0; this is a time-consistent policy. The costliest deposits should again be set aside (for exam-
ple through a Pigouvian tax of equal present-discounted value in the two periods).
4.1.3 Terms of trade effects for non-energy goods
Unilateral carbon pricing increases the costs of producing carbon-intensive goods in countries
that aim at emission reductions, relative to the costs of carbon-intensive goods in other countries
(see e.g. Felder and Rutherford, 1993). As a consequence, firms and consumers in any country
have an incentive to substitute towards goods produced in the latter group of countries. If firms in
these countries expand their production of carbon-intensive goods at the expense of production
in abating countries, emissions in non-abating countries increase. This, in a nutshell, is the terms
of trade channel of carbon leakage.
The degree to which leakage occurs through the terms of trade channel depends on the ease with
which one can substitute between goods from different regions. In AGE models, this is repre-
sented by the Armington elasticity: the larger the elasticity, the more homogenous the goods, and
the easier one will switch to goods from (cheaper) non-abating countries, inducing higher leak-
age. Paltsev (2001) explicitly varies the values of the elasticity of substitution between domestic
goods and imports, and the elasticity of substitution between imports from different regions to
study the consequences for carbon leakage. Reducing the former from 4 to 1 and the latter from
8 to 4 reduces the leakage rate from 10.5% to 6.9%; increasing the former to 8 and simultaneously
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increasing the latter to 16 gives a leakage rate of 15.4%. Burniaux and Oliveira Martins (forthcom-
ing) start with an elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods (recall that they
model only Annex I and non-Annex I) equal to 4. Increasing it to 20 does not push the leakage rate
beyond 4%. However, a very low elasticity might induce negative leakage: as imports and domes-
tic goods are complements, an increase in the domestic price reduces imports, thereby reducing
production and emissions in non-Annex I.
Copeland and Taylor (2005) introduce environmental damages due to a global pollutant in an an-
alytical static two-good two-factor K-country trade model. Goods from the two countries are ho-
mogenous (no Armington assumption; this favors strong terms of trade effects), and one good
is pollution-intensive. By assumption, one region reduces emissions, while the unconstrained re-
gion is a dirty good exporter. Unilateral emission reductions induces free-rider effects as described
in section 4.1.1, but in addition they cause substitution effects in production (working in favor of
leakage) as well as substitution effects in consumption and income effects in the demand for en-
vironmental quality (both working against leakage). The first and last effect are not present in
CGE models as these do not allow for damages to affect utility and thereby a demand for environ-
mental policy. Whether, in the Copeland and Taylor (2005) model, unilateral emission reductions
induce leakage, depends on the elasticities of marginal damage with respect to emissions and real
income, the price elasticity of the dirty good with respect to emissions, as well as on the pattern of
production and trade. The authors argue that negative leakage cannot be ruled out.
4.1.4 International trade in factors of production
If environmental regulations in the cooperating countries reduce the rate of return to capital, and
capital is internationally mobile, we may observe capital flight towards the non-cooperating coun-
tries. If more capital in the foreign country increases the marginal productivity of polluting in-
puts, foreign pollution will increase and thus offset emission reductions at home (see e.g. Maestad,
2007).11
Babiker (2001) studies the effect of different degrees of international capital mobility on carbon
leakage using a forward-looking CGE model, based on data for 1992. He finds that carbon leakage
is virtually unaffected by changes in the mobility of international capital. A similar result is found
11A related literature studies the effects of environmental policy on capital flight through manufacturing plant relo-
cation decisions. Jeppesen, List, and Folmer (2002) review the empirical literature through a quantitative meta-analysis
and conclude that it is not possible to draw firm conclusions regarding the effects of environmental regulations on
capital flows.
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by Burniaux and Oliveira Martins (forthcoming), who use a static model using data for 1995. They
even find that with high capital mobility, negative leakage rates are possible when the Armington
elasticity for non-energy goods is low.12
Kuik (2005) concludes that the CGE literature seems to suggest that capital flight to non-abating
countries will not be of major significance in the context of the Kyoto Protocol, at least during
the first commitment period (2008-2012). According to him, a major factor behind this result is
the lack of absorptive capacity in developing countries. It should be noted, however, that most
of these studies were performed using data from the 1990s. Since then, globalization has taken
off and some countries – notably China – have found a central place in the world economy. Since
trade with these countries as well as investments in developing countries have taken a big flight in
the last 20 years, it is now easier to shift capital and production abroad than in was in the 1990s.
Hence it would be interesting to study the effect of the trade in capital channel on carbon leakage
using recent data.
4.1.5 Technological change and technology spillovers
The fifth and most recent channel through which emissions by non-abating countries are affected
after an emission reduction in other countries is through technology spillovers. Inspired by the lit-
erature on endogenous technological change (see e.g. Romer, 1990, Acemoglu, 2002), a literature
on the effects of technological change and knowledge spillovers on (the costs of) climate policy
has developed. However, only few papers brought this dimension into the discussion regarding
carbon leakage. Golombek and Hoel (2004) introduce knowledge spillovers in a static analytical
model where two countries have to decide how much to abate and how much to invest in R&D.
By assumption, this investment reduces abatement costs. An exogenous fraction of R&D expen-
ditures spills over to the other country. They show that under several model specifications it is
possible that in response to increase in abatement in one country (due to greener preferences),
abatement in the other country may increase as well, i.e. leakage may be negative.
Whereas in Golombek and Hoel (2004) R&D expenditures are beneficial for the environment by
assumption, Di Maria and Van der Werf (2008) endogenize the nature of technological change.
They use a dynamic analytical 2-region 2-sector model where both countries are technologically
developed and have fully enforced intellectual property rights, but only one region has a cap on
emissions (for example the EU vs. the US). Knowledge developed in one country fully spills over
12Since the paper does not report the value of the elasticity of substitution between energy and value added, it is
unclear where this result exactly comes from.
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to the other as firms in each country can buy licenses to use blueprints developed in the other
country. One sector emits carbon dioxide in its production process while the other is clean, and
the two goods are used as an input for a final good through a CES production function. In their first
model, both sectors have the same (endogenous) rate of technological change and a tightening of
the unilateral emissions cap induces an increase in emissions by the other region (carbon leakage)
through a terms of trade effect, but global emissions decrease. Next they study the case where
the rate of technological change can differ endogenously between sectors. That is, investors can
decide whether to invest in blueprints in one sector or the other (directed technical change). The
tightening of the cap in the abating country decreases the size of the energy-intensive sector and
hence the market for energy-complementing innovations, but at the same time this increases the
price of energy. The net effect of these two mechanisms is always to increase the productivity of
the abundant factor, thereby increasing the marginal productivity of the clean sector and reducing
the share of energy. They find that, except for the case of a unit elasticity of substitution in final
goods production, carbon leakage will be smaller with directed technical change than when the
rates of technology of both sectors develop at an equal rate. Di Maria and Van der Werf (2008)
show that carbon leakage will be negative if the elasticity of substitution in the final goods sector
is sufficiently high.13
Gerlagh and Kuik (2007) build the mechanisms developed in Di Maria and Van der Werf (2008) into
the static GTAP-E AGE model to study carbon leakage in the context of the Kyoto Protocol. They
find that without technological change and the knowledge spillover channel, leakage is 13.8% in
the case where Annex I countries comply with their Kyoto targets, while it is 16.8% for the case
where the US and Australia do not comply. Introducing technology spillovers unambiguously re-
duces carbon leakage, while if more than 30 percent of the input-substitution induced by unilat-
eral climate policy would be due to input-saving technical change and if this technical knowledge
would freely spill over between countries, carbon leakage could indeed become negative.
13Di Maria and Van der Werf (2008) argue that a transformation of this elasticity can be interpreted as the demand
elasticity for a composite fossil energy product, and the condition for negative leakage is then that this elasticity should
be larger than 2. Empirical estimates for ’broad’ energy tend to be lower than this value, while estimates for individual
fossil products can be higher, so the elasticity for ‘composite fossil energy’ (which is broader than individual fossil
energy products but narrower than aggregate energy) may indeed be higher than 2.
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4.2 Leakage rates due to unilateral policy: results from the applied general equilib-
rium literature
In the previous subsection, we have presented five possible channels for a unilateral cutback in
emissions to affect emissions in other countries. Three of these channels are present in most the
numerical models used in the applied general equilibrium literature. The technological change
channel is only present in Gerlagh and Kuik (2007) while the marginal damages channel is absent
in all models.
The leakage rates presented above range from negative (in Gerlagh and Kuik, 2007, due to knowl-
edge spillovers) to some 15%. The only exception – discussed in section 4.1.2 – is the case of low
coal supply elasticities in Burniaux and Oliveira Martins (forthcoming), where leakage rates ap-
proach 100% as supply elasticities approach zero.14 Other papers find moderate leakage rates (for
a range of policies and assumptions) as well: Felder and Rutherford (1993), Perroni and Ruther-
ford (1993), Elliott, Foster, Kortum, Munson, Pérez Cervantes, and Weisbach (2010) and Böhringer,
Fischer, and Rosendahl (2010) do not find leakage rates higher than 28%.
Only one paper in the AGE modeling literature presents a case where a Green Paradox occurs.
Babiker (2005) studies the effect of the obligations agreed upon in the Kyoto Protocol on interna-
tional carbon leakage using a static model of the world economy, with unit supply elasticities for
oil and gas, an elasticity of 0.5 for coal, and data for 1992. The major contribution of this paper is
the introduction of increasing returns to scale in the production of energy-intensive goods (due to
a sunk cost; firms impose a mark-up over marginal cost; profits are still zero due to free entry and
exit of firms). The model without increasing returns, and with the assumption of regionally differ-
entiated goods (Armington assumption) gives a leakage rate of 20%, which is close to the upper
bound of the rates found by the models discussed above. Introducing increasing returns to scale
in the production of energy-intensive goods increases the leakage rate to 25%. Introducing a glob-
ally integrated world market for these goods (Armington elasticity going to infinity), but assuming
constant returns to scale, increases the leakage rate from 20% to 60%. Combining increasing re-
turns with an integrated world market for energy-intensive goods leads to a leakage rate of 130%:
global emissions increase in response to the Kyoto Protocol, and a Green Paradox occurs.
14Recall that Paltsev (2001) only finds a leakage rate of 14.7% in the case of a supply elasticity of 0.5 for all fossil fuels.
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4.3 Carbon leakage and the Green Paradox: conclusions
Unilateral emission reductions can induce non-abating countries to change their emissions in
response. We have identified five channels through which this may occur. None of the papers
discussed above combines all five channels, and the applied general equilibrium literature usually
allows for three of them (energy market channel, terms of trade channel, and international trade
in capital).
Two analytical papers and one AGE paper found that under specific assumptions a Green Paradox
may occur, that is, that non-abating countries increase their emissions by a larger amount than
the cut-back by abating countries such that global emissions increase in response to a unilateral
emission reduction.
Hoel (1991) studied the marginal damages channel using an analytical model where a country’s
environmental damages depend on emission reductions from its own abatement and the abate-
ment level of the second country. With strictly convex damage and abatement cost functions, a
Green Paradox may occur in the case of cooperative behaviour through side payments, depend-
ing on the concavity of abatement cost functions. Since marginal damage costs levels are hard
to quantify in reality (see the wide range of estimates in Tol, 2009), let alone exact marginal dam-
age functions, it is hard to include the marginal damage channel in the quantitative literature on
carbon leakage.
Eichner and Pethig (2010) use a two-period model with a non-renewable resource and focus on
the energy market channel. They find that a unilateral emission reduction may induce a global
increase in first-period emissions if – in the case of an emission reduction in the first period – the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is sufficiently low or the demand elasticity for fossil fuels
in the non-abating region is sufficiently high. They conclude that the requirement of clearing
the market for the consumption good in both periods combined with the Hotelling rule tends to
exacerbate carbon leakage when the first-period cap is tightened. This suggests interesting paths
for new, quantitative research. Most AGE models are either static or recursively dynamic, i.e. they
are not forward-looking models, let alone including non-renewable resources. Simulations and
sensitivity analysis using models with these characteristics (such as MERGE) could provide further
insights in whether it is likely that a (weak) Green Paradox will occur due to international carbon
leakage.
Babiker (2005) uses an AGE model, where leakage effects occur through the energy market chan-
nel (low supply elasticities for fossil fuels) and especially the terms of trade channel: increasing
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returns to scale in the production of energy-intensive goods combined with an integrated world
market for these goods led him to conclude that the Kyoto Protocol will induce an increase in
global emissions (weak Green Paradox). It should be noted that, when comparing the effect of an
integrated world market for energy intensive goods with the case of Armington elasticities, Babiker
also doubles the elasticity of substitution between the capital-labour-land composite on the one
hand and energy on the other (from 0.5 to 1), and increases the elasticity of substitution between
the capital-labour-land-energy composite on the one hand and intermediate inputs on the other
(from 0 – the usual assumption in AGE models – to 1). The first change seems to suppress leak-
age effects (easier to substitute to non-energy inputs in Annex I countries and hence smaller price
effects), while the effect of the second change is unclear. In addition, the benchmark mark-up
and hence the degree of market power due to the increasing returns assumption depends on the
benchmark market shares of each region. Hence, a scale effect occurs: the larger the aggregated
region (a modeling assumption), the larger the degree of market power, and the larger the leakage
effects due to increasing returns. By aggregating China and India in one region, and combining
other countries as well (e.g. dynamic Asian countries, dynamic economies of South America, and
– emissions reducing and hence working in opposite direction – OECD), stronger relocation effects
can be expected compared to the case of no aggregation. Hence, further research on the effect of
increasing returns to scale on carbon leakage is required.
Clearly, the Green Paradox is not a general conclusion from the literature on carbon leakage. Its
occurrence rather depends on specific assumptions. Indeed, several papers have shown the pos-
sibility of negative leakage: a reduction in emissions by countries (initially) without climate pol-
icy, in response to unilateral emission reductions by other countries. Still, it would be interesting
to study the assumptions underlying the Green Paradox results more closely and include those
elements that induce a Green Paradox under some conditions in other models. Using forward-
looking models could provide important further insights. Taking into account the role of non-
renewable resources seems especially interesting, as the (analytical) Hotelling models of Eichner
and Pethig (2010) and Hoel (2011) find the possibility of a Green Paradox occurring due to a uni-
lateral in the stringency of climate policy. Furthermore, it is important that AGE models use recent
data, due to the currently larger market shares of (generally non-abating) emerging economies on
the world market, as this could induce higher leakage rates.
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5 Supporting alternative energy technologies
Thus far we have discussed the effects of imperfect policies aimed at reducing GHG emissions
through a price on CO2. Alternatively, one can try to promote the use of clean energy sources, so
less of the carbon-emitting kind is needed, and the costs of meeting a particular emission target
can be reduced. However, large-scale affordable clean energy sources do not exist at the moment
(except for nuclear energy, which has its own disadvantages). In order to stabilize GHG concen-
trations, a ‘technological revolution’ is required (Barrett, 2009), which in turn requires support for
clean energy technologies that currently are not more than ideas, or are at most about to enter the
stage of diffusion. Indeed, Barrett (2006) argues that an effective climate treaty must promote both
the public good consisting of emissions reductions, and the public good consisting of knowledge
of new technologies that can lower mitigation costs.
As politicians prefer giving away subsidies over taxing particular goods and sectors, a wide array
of subsidies for clean energy technologies exists, ranging from support for fundamental R&D for
new nuclear energy technologies to subsidies for biofuel production and adoption subsidies for
solar and wind energy. In this section, we make a distinction between clean energy technologies
available at constant marginal cost (the backstop technology introduced in section 2; these tech-
nologies could be thought of as nuclear or solar energy) and energy technologies with upward-
sloping supply curves (such as biofuels that compete for land with other uses). The support for
these technologies can come in the form of R&D subsidies that induce a fall in the cost of the
alternative energy source, or in the form of a subsidy per unit of alternative energy used.
5.1 Alternative energy at constantmarginal cost
As in section 2, we start with the simple Hotelling model with zero marginal extraction costs, but
now extended with a backstop technology available at constant marginal cost b. Since the two
energy technologies are perfect substitutes and the price of the non-renewable fossil fuel grows at
the interest rate (see equation (3)), there exists an instant tb at which the economy switches from
fossil fuel to the backstop. The initial resource price p(0) and the instant tb are determined by the
condition that the resource stock gets exhausted before the switch to the backstop
tb∫
0
D
(
p(0)er t
)
dt = X¯ (10)
and the condition that at tb the backstop price b equals the scarcity rent:
p(0)er tb = b. (11)
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What is the effect of a policy, e.g. a subsidy for R&D for alternative energy technologies, that re-
duces the marginal cost of the clean backstop technology on the extraction and emissions path?
From the last equation it is easy to see that this brings the instant of the switch to the backstop
closer. However, with unchanged initial resource price p(0), this implies that some of the resource
remains unexploited, which induces resource owners to supply more at each point in time, which
in turn reduces the equilibrium resource price. Hence the reduction of the marginal cost of the
backstop increases extraction at each point in time: a weak Green Paradox occurs (see also Ger-
lagh, 2011). As a consequence, the instant of the switch to the backstop is earlier, as compared to
the case of the higher backstop price.15 Assuming that marginal damages grow at a rate lower than
the interest rate, Gerlagh (2011) also shows that in the simple Hotelling model a decrease in the
marginal cost of the backstop induces an increase in the net present value of damages, and hence
the strong Green Paradox arises as well.16
Van der Ploeg and Withagen (2010) extend the Hotelling model with damages from the stock of
CO2 in the atmosphere through an additively separable quadratic damage function (a common
assumption in this literature, see e.g. Hoel and Kverndokk, 1996, Tahvonen, 1997), and assume
that unit extraction costs are linearly increasing in cumulative extraction.17 These two assump-
tions make that along the socially optimal extraction path the (finite) resource stock need not be
exhausted at the instant of the switch to the backstop. However, if the marginal cost of the alter-
native energy source is sufficiently high, or marginal damages are sufficiently low when the entire
resource stock is exhausted, the resource stock will be exhausted at this instant, and the model is
de facto of the Hotelling type, as in Gerlagh (2011). Using a linear demand function, van der Ploeg
and Withagen (2010) find both the weak and the strong Green Paradox for the Hotelling model as
well.18
Hoel (2011) shows that the weak Green Paradox also occurs in a partial equilibrium two-country
Hotelling model, with countries differing in the stringency of their emissions reduction policy:
as the scarcity rent and hence the consumer price go down in response to the lower price of the
15These results can be shown taking total derivatives of (10) and (11) and calculating dp(0)/db and dtb /db; see
e.g. Gerlagh (2011).
16See footnote 9 for a discussion of the assumption that the social cost of carbon grows at a rate lower than the interest
rate.
17Since they abstract from natural uptake of CO2 from the atmosphere, each unit of emissions stays in the atmosphere
forever, which reduces the two state variable optimization problem to a single stock problem. Due to this assumption,
the social cost of carbon grows at a rate lower than the utility discount rate. See footnote 9 for a discussion.
18Despite the strong Green Paradox, total welfare (i.e. discounted welfare from energy use minus discounted dam-
ages) increases in response to the (free) decrease in marginal cost of the backstop.
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backstop, near-term emissions increase. For a sufficiently small difference between the tax rates
of the two countries, the two regions combined respond as in the closed economy model and the
switch to the backstop will be made at an earlier point in time in both countries. Hence emissions
increase at each point in time and the strong Green Paradox occurs as well. Hoel (2011) shows that
the country with the higher tax will always make the switch earlier, but the instant of the switch by
the low-tax country depends on its elasticity of demand for energy. If the tax difference between
the two countries is large enough and the demand elasticity in the low-tax country is sufficiently
low, this country will postpone the switch to the backstop, and, if the social cost of carbon declines
over time, the strong Green Paradox need not occur.
When instead of a cost reduction both countries introduces an identical subsidy, a strong and
weak Green Paradox occur when the difference in tax rates is sufficiently small and both countries
introduce an identical subsidy. These results are identical to those following a fall in the (constant)
marginal cost of the backstop, described above, as this is equivalent to an ‘eternal’ and identical
subsidy. However, when the tax difference is sufficiently large, the strong Green Paradox need not
occur, depending on demand elasticities. A weak Paradox will also occur following a unilateral
subsidy increase when both countries have the same tax rates but different subsidy rates. If the
subsidy is increased in the country that initially has the lowest subsidy, a strong Green Paradox
occurs as well.
Another interesting contribution to the literature on the effects of lower (constant) marginal cost
on resource extraction and carbon dioxide emissions comes from Strand (2007), who introduces
uncertainty regarding the discovery of a clean backstop technology to the (closed economy) Ho-
telling model in the context of a technology treaty. Once such a treaty has been agreed upon, there
is a probability that a clean energy source, available at constant marginal cost, will be discovered.
The author assumes that the period until the technology has been developed is exponentially dis-
tributed with parameterλ (Poisson process), so that the price net of (constant marginal) extraction
costs has to grow at rate r +λ. Then there are two effects of the treaty on cumulative extraction at
any point in time. First, the positive probability of the resource becoming redundant increases the
extraction rate, which works in favor of a (weak) Green Paradox. Second, there’s an effect in the
opposite direction: the longer the time horizon, the larger the probability that the technology has
already arrived, so the more likely it is that cumulative extraction is lower than it would be without
the possibility of a backstop being discovered. Using simulations, the author shows that for a short
time horizon, cumulative extraction increases with λ: the larger the probability of finding a clean
energy source, the more likely it is that a weak Green Paradox will occur (first effect dominates). For
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a longer time horizon, however, the second effect dominates, and cumulative extraction decreases
with λ.
Next, Strand (2007) studies the case where once a treaty is signed (at t = 0), it takes S years before
the probability λ plays a role. This lag seems realistic, since first the treaty must be agreed upon,
then the technological effort must be financed and undertaken, and once developed, the technol-
ogy must be adopted by different firms and countries. Using simulations the author shows that at
all times smaller than or equal to S, cumulative extraction increases as a result of the technology
treaty.19
Next to studying the effects of a lower marginal cost of the backstop in the context of the Hotelling
model, Gerlagh (2011) and van der Ploeg and Withagen (2010) also study the case of the Heal
model introduced in section 2. The model of van der Ploeg and Withagen (2010) has the proper-
ties of the Heal model when, in their model, the marginal cost of the backstop is sufficiently low
such that the resource stock will not be exhausted at the instant of the switch to the backstop. In
this case, a marginal reduction in the cost of the backstop does not induce a Green Paradox as ex-
traction and emissions are lower at each point in time compared to the case of a higher backstop
price.
Gerlagh (2011) also discusses the effect of a cheaper backstop technology in the context of the Heal
model, using a linear demand function and an extraction cost function that is linear in cumulative
extraction (both as in van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2010). The fall in the marginal cost of the
backstop induces a fall in the scarcity rent of the resource, which in turn induces an increase in
(initial) extraction. So contrary to van der Ploeg and Withagen (2010), Gerlagh finds a weak Green
Paradox when the marginal cost of the backstop falls in the case of a Heal model. However, the
instant of the switch to the backstop tb falls sufficiently to offset this emissions increase in terms of
marginal damages: with linear functional forms, a strong Green Paradox does not arise in Gerlagh’s
model, as in van der Ploeg and Withagen (2010).
The difference in the results regarding the Heal model stems from the different conditions of the
resource stock and (marginal) damages in the two papers. Whereas Gerlagh (2011) assumes the
resource to be inexhaustible, van der Ploeg and Withagen (2010) assume an exhaustible resource,
which leads to a slightly different extraction cost function. More importantly, whereas Gerlagh
(2011) looks at any extraction path, van der Ploeg and Withagen (2010) study the effects of a lower
marginal cost of the backstop along an optimal extraction path. These two differences in modeling
lead to different results for the quantity of the resource left in situ at the instant of the switch to the
19Note that this resembles the announcement effects studied in section 3.
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backstop and the timing of this instant.
Van der Ploeg and Withagen (2010) also study the policy of a subsidy to the alternative energy
source, in the absence of a carbon tax. Assuming that the social marginal cost of public funds is
equal to unity (no deadweight loss), van der Ploeg and Withagen (2010) show that if the extrac-
tion cost of the last unit of the resource are lower than the marginal cost of the backstop and the
marginal damage from carbon dioxide is sufficiently high (so it is optimal to exhaust the resource
stock), a per-unit subsidy for the backstop induces both a weak and a strong Green Paradox. In-
deed, under these conditions a tax on the backstop is optimal. In this case, a subsidy would reduce
the scarcity rent of fossil fuels, which increases resource demand and supply at each point in time.
Once the resource gets exhausted, the tax should be abolished. If damages are large, an alternative
policy to the tax would be to subsidize the backstop to such an extent that it becomes attractive
to stop using the non-renewable immediately, or compensate resource owners for not exploiting
their resource. If marginal costs of the backstop and of extraction are such that it is optimal to
leave some of the resource deposits in situ, no Green Paradox occurs in response to the subsidy as
the switch to the backstop is made earlier and more reserves remain unexploited, and it is optimal
to subsidize the alternative energy source.
In sum: with constant marginal costs for the backstop, in both the Hotelling model and the Heal
model a weak Green Paradox may occur after a fall in the price of the backstop, or after an increase
in a subsidy. However, the strong Green Paradox has only been found for the Hotelling model.
5.2 Alternative energy with an upward-sloping supply curve
As noted above, a more realistic description of alternative energy sources, at least regarding biofu-
els, is that marginal costs are not constant but rather increasing with supply. Gerlagh (2011, section
3) and Grafton, Kompas, and Long (2010) model linear supply functions S(·) for alternative energy,
and the demand for fossil fuels as a residual demand:
S(p(t ))=ψ0+ψ1p(t ); (12)
tb∫
0
D(t )− p(t )−ψ0
ψ1
dt = X¯ . (13)
Furthermore, it is assumed in both papers that marginal cost of resource extraction are constant
and the resource stock is finite, so the resources side of the model reflects the Hotelling model of
section 2. Under these assumptions, there is a period of joint use of the two energy sources.
Continuing with the assumption of linear demand, Gerlagh (2011) shows that lower marginal costs
of the backstop, either through lower ψ0 or lower ψ1, induces neither a weak, nor a strong Green
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Paradox. The cheaper substitute reduces resource demand at each point in time and lengthens
the period over which the resource is used, while the (joint) use of the alternative energy source is
higher.
Although Grafton, Kompas, and Long (2010) study the effects of an ad valorem subsidy for the al-
ternative energy source rather than a cost reduction, they find similar results: neither Paradox oc-
curs after an increase in the subsidy rate. With nonlinear demand, however, a weak Green Paradox
may occur, depending on parameter values. They confirm these results for the case of monopoly
extraction.
Hoel and Jensen (2010) introduce carbon capture and storage (CCS) to the Hotelling model with
an upward-sloping supply curve for renewables (and zero extraction costs). CCS is a technology
that can capture the largest part of carbon dioxide during or before the production process of
electricity. The captured CO2 can then be (near-permanently) stored so emissions from electric-
ity production go down. However, CCS reduces the efficiency of a power plant (more energy per
unit of electricity is needed due to the CCS capture process) and comes with monetary costs for
capture, transport and storage. Hoel and Jensen (2010) assume that CCS is capable of bringing
emissions from fossil fuel use to zero, but do assume that it comes at a money cost and an energy
cost, both per unit of final energy produced (y and z respectively). Furthermore they assume that
CCS is only available in the second period of their two-period model, as is renewable energy (sup-
plied competitively at increasing marginal cost: S(p−σ), where σ is a per-unit cost reduction). By
assumption, only energy from a non-renewable resource is available during the first period, while
all three energy sources (fossil, fossil with CCS, and renewable) are used in the second period,
even though their respective outputs can be traded one for one (e.g. electricity). They impose a
cumulative emission constraint to their model (see Allen, Frame, Huntingford, Jones, Lowe, Mein-
shausen, and Meinshausen, 2009), such that without CCS, part of the resource stock has to remain
unexploited, while with CCS this same amount has to be captured. They abstract from natural
uptake so each unit of emissions reduces the remaining carbon budget with one unit. Before we
discuss the case of lower costs for CCS, we first continue the discussion of lower cost for renewable
energy.
Suppose the ceiling on cumulative emissions is enforced in both periods, so the intertemporally
efficient carbon (shadow) price grows at the interest rate. A lower cost of the alternative energy
source (increase in σ) increases the supply of renewable energy, which reduces the value of the
fossil fuel. As the Hotelling price path shifts down, extraction in the first period increases, but
second-period extraction declines due to the given stock and the increased use of the renewable:
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although the ceiling will not be violated, a weak Green Paradox occurs. This result deviates from
the results found by Gerlagh (2011) and Grafton, Kompas, and Long (2010), who did not find a
Green Paradox following a cost reduction for the alternative energy source. However, in the latter
two papers, a lower backstop price reduced demand for the non-renewable in each point in time.
In Hoel and Jensen (2010), by assumption, only the non-renewable is used in the first period. The
fall in the value of the non-renewable due to the cheaper alternative induces an increase in first-
period demand. This result also holds when it is not possible to impose a carbon price in the first
period.
Next, the authors study the effects of lower costs of CCS. If the ceiling on cumulative emissions is
enforced in both periods, lower non-energy costs y do not affect the amount of CCS in period 2,
as this is given by the difference between the ceiling and the initial resource stock. Hence the ex-
traction path is not affected either. Lower energy cost for CCS z, however, reduces the opportunity
cost of CCS in period 2, so it becomes attractive to emit more in period 1. Although the ceiling will
not be violated, a weak Green Paradox occurs.
When it is not possible to impose a carbon price in the first period, lower money cost for CCS
reduces the opportunity cost for CCS in the second period, so the regulator has to lower the carbon
price compared to the case of no cost reduction. This makes fossil energy use in the second period
more attractive so extraction is postponed and first-period emissions decrease. The effects of a
decrease in the energy cost on first-period extraction in this case are undetermined. On the one
hand, postponing extraction becomes more interesting as the opportunity costs of CCS and hence
the tax decrease. The resulting lower consumer price for energy makes it less attractive to supply
renewable energy in the second period. On the other hand, energy use for CCS will increase as the
costs of CCS go down, which increases period 2 fossil energy demand. Compared to the case of
an efficient carbon tax, a (weak) Green Paradox is less likely to occur when the first-period carbon
tax is zero. Hoel and Jensen (2010) show that these results also hold for a model with endogenous
total extraction (Heal model).
In the Heal-type model in Hoel (2010a), investments in the alternative energy technology are en-
dogenous (see section 2.1). A fraction a of the returns to these investments are obtained in the first
period, the rest in the second. A per unit investment subsidy increases investment in the clean en-
ergy, but its effect on first-period emissions is ambiguous. Hoel (2010a) shows that for any level
of marginal extraction costs there exists a threshold level of a below which a weak Green Paradox
occurs. He argues that if only a small fraction of the returns to investment are obtained in period
1, encouraging investment will reduce demand for the resource in the future considerably more
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than in the present, which induces resource owners to speed up extraction.
In sum: the case of an increasing supply function for renewable energy has mostly been studied
using a Hotelling model. In the simplest version of this model, with linear demand and supply, no
Green Paradox occurs in response to lower marginal cost of the backstop or a user subsidy. A weak
Green Paradox has been found for two-period models.
5.3 Alternative energy technologies and the Green Paradox: conclusions
Policies that affect the cost of an alternative energy source generally have two effects. They reduce
the value of the resource stock in situ, which induces a lower resource price and increased resource
demand. In addition, the instant of the switch from the fossil fuel to the alternative energy source
is affected. In the simplest model, this induces both a weak and a strong Green Paradox. Subse-
quent extensions of the Hotelling and models make a strong Green Paradox less likely to occur, if
the model is in continuous time. Obviously, those extensions make the model more realistic, so
perhaps Sinn’s (2008) worries are justified based on simple theoretical models, but less so in reality.
Still, further research is needed. Imperfect substitution between fossil and renewable energy types
and the combination of renewable energy policies with unilateral carbon taxes seem an interesting
path for future research, although this will probably require the use of numerical models.
6 Concluding remarks
Based on the opening words of Sinn (2008), it is easy to get worried about the effectiveness of the
suboptimal climate policies currently imposed. These worries are supported by the simple text-
book models of non-renewable resources: steeply rising carbon tax paths, implementation lags
and subsidies for alternative energy sources, all encourage resource owners to increase current ex-
traction, leading to a (weak) Green Paradox as current emissions rise rather than fall. Indeed, this
emissions rise may even lead to an increase in the net present value of climate damages: a strong
Green Paradox. However, more complicated and realistic analyses – which include increasing ex-
traction costs, upward-sloping supply curves for alternative energy, and an international dimen-
sion – seem to view the emergence of a Green Paradox less likely. Still, combining the mechanisms
and insights from different models may very well lead to new or mutually reinforced unintended
policy outcomes.
An important direction for further research would be to incorporate more realistic market features,
such as the interaction between resource owners, who may have some market power (e.g. on the
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oil market), and governments aiming at emission reductions for fossil fuels, as for example stud-
ied in Gerlagh and Liski (2011). Another important issue issue to consider would be the extent to
which the policies studied in the Green Paradox literature are incentive compatible. As mentioned
in for example Hoel (2010b) and Hoel (2010a), governments may not be able to commit to the pro-
jected tax or subsidy paths. Expectations and hence credibility about future tax and subsidy paths
are extremely relevant for climate policy, especially in the context of non-renewable resources.
Clearly more research on these issues is needed.
An alternative strategy for future research could be to simplify rather than complicate models, as
decision makers in the real world may not be as forward looking as assumed in current models.
For example, Saudi Arabia (one of the main players on the market for one of the most important
fossil fuels: oil) seems to act more like a market-maker – increasing oil supply when prices rise too
fast in order to stabilize the price – than as an intertemporally optimizing resource owner.
Overall, the most striking void in this literature is an empirical assessment of the Green Paradox.
Although some authors use numerical methods to solve models with non-renewable resources
that are too complicated to solve analytically, these simulations provide no evidence as to the
relevance of the Green Paradox. The large literature on carbon leakage on the other hand has a long
history using simulation models calibrated using actual data, but these models usually lack non-
renewable resources and forward-looking agents. Although such models do exist and have been
used for climate policy simulations (see e.g. Bosetti, Carraro, and Tavoni, 2009, Blanford, Richels,
and Rutherford, 2009), they have so far not focused on the kind of imperfect policies underlying the
Green Paradox. Furthermore, past policy changes have hardly been used to study Green Paradoxes
using econometric techniques. Since, as noted in the introduction, the Green Paradox is not only
relevant for climate policy but also for other branches of environmental economics, the obvious
next stage in the Green Paradox literature would be to take the theory to the data.
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